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freedom, in an Aristotelian sense, in the concept of happiness, but, again,
in so doing the concept of happiness would become so broad as to be
useless (somewhat as has happened with the concept of formal rationality,
according to which all behaviour – even drinking petrol – can be described
as rational).
The closing sentence of this chapter is also a good synthesis of the
book: ‘one does not have to be a Gandhi (or a Martin Luther King,
or a Nelson Mandela, or Aung San Suu Kyi) to understand that one’s
objectives and priorities could stretch well beyond the narrow limits of
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Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-
Being, George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Princeton University
Press, vi + 185 pp.
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton have gained considerable attention
for a series of articles (2000, 2002, 2005, 2008) which make the concept of
identity central to the standard theory of individual behaviour and choice.
This book reviews their arguments in a compact, non-technical manner
and proclaims ‘identity economics’ a new approach and important
advance in economics. Identity economics, as they define it, investigates
how social norms associated with expected behaviour in social groups
influence individual behaviour and choice. For example, their opening
discussion of sexual discrimination at Price Waterhouse tells how people
acted in a discriminatory way toward Ann Hopkins (the plaintiff in an
important U.S. Supreme Court civil rights case in 1988), because she failed
to abide by social norms regarding women. Akerlof and Kranton regard
identity economics as an extension of recent development in economics
(following Gary Becker) that ‘no longer confines itself to questions about
consumption and income: economists today also consider a variety of
noneconomic motives’ (p. 4). But they also say that identity economics
goes further in showing that social context matters in the following way:
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since ‘people have a notion of who they are’, that is, a self-image or what
their identities are, social group norms influence their ‘beliefs about how
they and others are supposed to behave’ (Ibid.). Thus in their view identity
economics brings greater realism into economics and allows economists to
create better and more useful models.
These improved models, to be sure, are traditional utility function
models that now incorporate social group norms that prescribe ideal or
exemplary behaviour for individuals associated with being members of
certain social groups. For every social group or social category with which
a person can be identified, there corresponds an argument in their utility
function that motivates choice just as do those arguments associated
with ordinary ‘garden-variety’ or ‘individualistic’ tastes. Individuals still
seek to maximize utility, but the scope of the tradeoffs they face is now
extended to include the effects of their acting in conformity with or
contrary to the social norms of the groups with which they identify. That
is, individuals gain or lose ‘identity utility’ when their actions conform
or depart from social group norms. Further, they may also gain or lose
‘identity utility’ when other individuals’ actions conform or depart from
recognized social norms – what Akerlof and Kranton regard as a new
type of externality. This can be quite complicated, as in the example of
Ann Price’s colleagues at Price Waterhouse who acted toward her in a
discriminatory way because they lost ‘identity utility’ when she failed to
conform to their norms of behaviour for women.
Akerlof and Kranton only outline this identity framework in part 1,
and do not duplicate or further explain the formal analysis they produced
in their previous papers. Parts 2 and 3 constitute the main body of
the book which is devoted to applying this identity framework to four
subjects: organizations, education, gender in the labour market and
in the home, and race and poverty; part 4 is more methodological,
and comments on what makes for ‘good theory’ along lines essentially
following Milton Friedman.
It needs to be emphasized from the beginning, then, that Identity
Economics is not a scholarly monograph written for a specialist audience
but rather a mass-market book presumably meant in its pricing, level
of exposition, popular writing style and potential monetary payoff for
its authors and its publisher – like Freakonomics and Akerlof and Robert
Shiller’s Animal Spirits (also priced at $24.95 by Princeton University
Press) – to take advantage not only of the new taste for economics writing
in the reading public but to also function as a supplementary text in
economics teaching. The two main characteristics of this new popular
economics genre seem to be that economics should now be thought to be
‘fun’ and also that it tells us something about the ‘real world’ – two matters
about which economists have become somewhat defensive in light of the
widespread perception on the part of students and many in the public
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that economics is neither (see Vromen 2009 on the making economics ‘fun’
phenomenon).
Of course it is hardly clear that it ought to be an aim to make
economics fun, much less what this might involve. But one thing it
appears to imply for Akerlof and Kranton is that economics ought to be
made simple and easy to understand. Thus they have pitched their book at
a very elementary level that assumes little more knowledge of economics
from the reader than that economics has something to do with supply
and demand (p. 14). For example, the chapter that introduces the authors’
identity framework begins in an almost patronizing way as if this were a
student’s first introduction to economics:
Economists have a way of describing motivation: we describe an individual
as having a ‘utility function.’ This is a mathematical expression that
characterizes what people care about. For example, a person may care
about today’s consumption and about future consumption. That person
then makes decisions to maximize her utility function (9).
It’s as if the voice the authors decided to adopt is one that says, ‘now listen
carefully kids (but don’t worry, we’ll go slowly!) . . . ’ Aside, then, from the
fact that this book was not written for scholars, this level of exposition has
odd effects, since the topic of identity and economics is indeed anything
but simple. This means that quite subtle issues, which have been at
the centre of much recent debate among economists, psychologists and
philosophers, such as the relationship between other-regardingness and
the traditional view of taste as independent of social context, are either not
addressed in the book, or are rather quickly dispensed with in very broad
brush stroke theory, and with bold assertions that social context matters
and that economists are now coming to appreciate this (10–11).
But of course it is still fair to ask the authors difficult questions, such
as: if social context matters in the case of social identity, and our choices
are driven by social norms, why doesn’t it also matter in the case of all the
rest of our more ordinary ‘garden-variety’ tastes, since these could also be
norm-driven? If this were allowed, however, social context wouldn’t then
just matter; it could be altogether determinative of choice and behaviour,
so that an ‘individual’ might have many sources and kinds of social
identity (not just including group identifications), but evidently not a
personal identity that would somehow single them out and hold them
together as an independent being. Akerlof and Kranton of course reject
this view, since it would undermine the standard view to which they are
committed that preferences are in some degree exogenous or independent
in the sense of deriving from or belonging to the individual (however they
happened to come about). This is indeed what allows them to talk about
there being trade-offs between our identity commitments and all the other
things we pursue. But this nonetheless leaves them with the position that
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on one level our choices are endogenous in that they are driven by social
norms but on another level they are not. Alarms should be going off here
about what the grounds are for this distinction, but that they don’t see a
problem is no doubt due to the fact that they have assumed from the outset
that a person is an independent being in virtue of having an individual
utility function, albeit one now ‘enhanced’ or ‘augmented’ by the need
to observe certain social norms. That is, what they assume, though to be
clear they do not actually say this, is that an individual’s personal identity
is their utility function. Given this anchor, a person could be influenced
by social norms (a step in the direction of realism), so that context matters,
but would still ultimately remain an individual. People might thus have
many social identities, but as only arguments in the individual’s utility
function they would be subsumed under their utility function personal
identities.
It is unfortunate, then, that having decided that identity matters to
economics Akerlof and Kranton didn’t simply come out and say that
on the standard view an individual’s personal identity is their utility
function. This would have given more clarity to their discussion of the
concept of identity, since people then would be less likely to be led into the
confusion that a person’s individual identity is paradoxically their social
identity, and it would also have made the proposition that an individual’s
personal identity is their utility function available for evaluation.
However, such an evaluation, I believe, would not be favourable to their
view for two reasons I have elsewhere set forth (Davis 2011).
First, it would create an important problem for their explanation
of choice behaviour. As they explain choice, individuals face trade-offs
between identity utility gains/losses and ordinary consumption utility
gains/losses. If I feel bound by a particular social identity norm, I may
sacrifice consumption to maximize utility. But while Akerlof and Kranton
allow we have many social identities (and a vector of social identity
arguments in our utility functions), they do not address how people
trade-off their social identities against one another and, more significantly,
choose whether they will even accept certain social identity assignments,
as when one chooses to ignore a particular identity because one rejects its
norms for ethical or practical reasons (cf. Sen 2006).
In our analysis, we sometimes describe people as choosing their identity.
Again, this phrasing could imply conscious choice, but we make no such
presumption (23).
They don’t do this because doing so would require that the individuals be
able to step outside of their utility function identities to make judgements
regarding their utility functions by evaluating or deliberating upon its
arguments. This would not only imply that there is something more to the
personal identity of the individual than just what is in the utility function,
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but would also make deliberation over one’s motives – an idea entirely
contrary to utility function reasoning – part of that personal identity. The
upshot, in any event, is that their utility function view of choice cannot
really explain an important domain of choice, which is what economics is
supposed to be able to do.
But there is a second, even more serious problem associated with the
utility function personal identity position, namely, that as an explanation
of individuality it is circular and empty. While it is not a goal of Identity
Economics to explain individuality, nonetheless they clearly assume
that people understood as collections of preferences are distinct and
individual. Yet one cannot show a person to be distinct and individual
in virtue of having some single set of preferences, since two different
people could have identical preferences. A person’s preferences only
mark them off as distinct individuals when we say that they are their
‘own’ preferences, so that however they came to have those preferences,
having them be their ‘own’ satisfies the requirement that they be seen
as exogenous. That is, it is not the character of a set of preferences per
se – that they somehow constitute an integral set – that individualizes
the person, but rather that that set somehow belongs to the person. But
then what makes a person a distinct individual is that they have their
‘own’ preferences, which is circular and accordingly tells us nothing about
individuality or personal identity. Needless to say, the ‘belongingness’
idea is also entirely untheorized.
Again, to be clear, Akerlof and Kranton restrict themselves to
discussing the concept of social identity, and do not attempt to say how
an individual’s social identities relate to their personal identity. ‘People’s
identity defines who they are – their social category’ (13). They explain
their grounds for focusing only social identity in terms of how they drew
on social psychology to elaborate their particular concept of social identity
– a matter that gets limited attention in Identity Economics but is explicit
in their first paper (2000). Thus, there they flag John Turner’s influential
self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner 1985), an approach known in social
psychology as the ‘social identity approach’, which is chiefly associated
with the social psychology of identity in the field of psychology (cf.
Hogg et al. 1995). They do not recognize or distinguish an important
alternative approach to social identity in social psychology, known as the
sociological approach to identity, which is chiefly associated with social
psychologists in sociology (Stets and Burke 2000). The psychologists’
social identity approach takes the individual as given, largely sets aside
personal identity issues, and asks how established social categories
impact individuals. In contrast, the sociological approach to social identity
derives from symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934), and investigates how
individuality/agency and social structure mutually influence one another,
and thus how social identity and personal identity are related.
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That Akerlof and Kranton, then, draw on the psychologists’ social
psychology approach to social identity allows them to take individuals
as given, while saying that individuals are impacted by social identity
assignments that can be made of them. They ignore the sociologists’
approach to social identity which would have raised the issue of how
individuals respond to and possibly deliberate over their social identity
assignments. As the latter would imply a different conception of the
individual than standard economics employs, it was, so to speak, off
their navigational charts before they ever left the harbour. This tells
us something interesting about economists’ selective borrowing from
other sciences, particularly psychology, in a period when economics and
rationality theory is virtually being overrun by ‘outsiders’. The best
defence in such circumstances, the lesson would seem to be, is to manage
rather than expect to restrain other-science conceptual entry, all with an
eye to what is most important to preserve of the traditional programme
in economics – here it seems, not rationality theory, but Robinson Crusoe
himself.
This may all seem to be no more than a set of academic debates and
concerns, but arguably something more significant is involved when we
think a bit more about how social identity assignments get made through
the creation of social group categories, and how Akerlof and Kranton then
presuppose this social construction process in their four applications of
their analysis.
Consider their Chapter Five on identity in organizations. Part of
what is involved here is a response to standard efficiency wage theory
formulated in principal-agent terms. On that view, firms pay higher
than competitive wages to secure effort from workers by employing
financial incentives to solve the principal-agent problem. But wait, say
Akerlof and Kranton: if you look at military organizations, loyalty to
the social group allows lower wages to be paid, as individuals trade
wages off against military social identities. That is, social context matters,
and missing this efficiency wage theory has got it backwards. Or do
Akerlof and Kranton have it backwards, since what they are effectively
arguing is that if we militarize the workplace by promoting firm loyalty
type social identities, we can reduce wages while maintaining or even
increasing output. Clearly key to this argument is the idea that social
identities are instruments wielded by someone to assign, mobilize or
somehow construct others’ social identities for them, a framework which
happens to comport with Turner’s ‘social identity approach’ because that
research programme doesn’t ask where social identities come from or how
they may be mediated by social processes or individuals themselves. In
this respect, Akerlof and Kranton’s position fits nicely with behavioral
economists’ libertarian or asymmetric paternalism, while also going
further. Whereas the latter only want to nudge individual choices toward
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the expert’s view of rationality, identity economics may be used by people
interested in nudging people’s identities, and not in their own interest but
in the interest of organizations with which they are to identify. This all
seems an important lesson regarding how economics borrows from social
psychology, and makes the issue of cross-disciplinary traffic more than
just an academic concern.
There are many other interesting issues in Identity Economics
application chapters that deserve the reader’s attention. A bit worrisome
is a tendency some of the discussion exhibits to reduce everything to
social identity norms as if there were no other sorts of norms, such as
character or virtue norms, which might cause behavior. For example,
one successful school discussed in Chapter Six (73) is described as
encouraging Five Habits of Mind. But does student success then result
from their identification with the school that has such a programme or
from prior acceptance of these norms? For Akerlof and Kranton it is
always the former. No doubt social identity is often important, but it may
also be an effect of other factors. This point sometimes gets lost in many of
the book’s examples, though Akerlof and Kranton are surely right to say
that identity often plays an important role in people’s behaviour.
John B. Davis
University of Amsterdam and Marquette University
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Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, John R. Searle,
Oxford University Press, 2010, 224 pages.
John R. Searle presented his first sketchy but influential analysis of
institutions in the first book that he published in 1969, Speech Acts. Inspired
by Elizabeth Anscombe’s distinction between brute and institutional facts
on the one hand and John Rawl’s distinction between rules we use for
convenience and rules that constitute certain practices, he maintained that
institutions are systems of constitutive rules. Such rules, he proposed,
facilitate the creation of institutional facts, for example the fact that a
certain utterance counts as a promise. Searle developed his ideas about
social relations and behaviours further in his 1995 book The Construction
of Social Reality. There is a lot of continuity between this book and Searle’s
latest book. So the question arises why anyone who is familiar with the
former would want to read the latter.
I can think of three reasons. (i) Searle presents his book as a
more general version of the social ontology he offered in his 1995
work. He claims that this is because ‘at that time [he] did not see
the centrality of Status Function Declarations in both creating and
maintaining institutional facts’ (p. 19). (ii) Searle develops his social
ontology in more detail. Over the years he has received many questions
and criticisms. Many of the developments, adjustments and refinements
are responses to those. (iii) They might, however, also have special
relevance to social scientists. Although anthropologists, sociologists and
economists have commented on his work and have regarded some of his
ideas as useful for the development of their theories, some social scientists
have also expressed doubts about the practical relevance of Searle’s social
philosophy.
The best way to tackle the third issue is by comparing social scientific
theories of institutions with Searle’s theory, and determining whether
anything valuable can be learned along the way. In this review I provide
some pointers as to how one might go about doing this. I shall start by
asking whether Searle’s theory of institutions is consistent with the idea
that institutions are unintended consequences of individual actions. This
idea seems to be challenged by Searle’s claim that they depend on status
function declarations. I argue that, if minor modifications are made, the
idea can be salvaged (1).
Subsequently I discuss two kinds of social structures that Searle
does not address: conventions and norms. In relation to conventions,
